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Abstract 
 
This contribution reviews the book entitled Against the New 
Constitutionalism authored by Tamas Gyorfi. He challenges the 
pivotal role given to judges in constitutional adjudication. 
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Review 
This notable addition to the series Elgar Monographs in Constitutional and 
Administrative Law is a thought-provoking contribution to the "legal versus 
political constitutionalism" debate. The author, a Hungarian scholar working 
in the UK, takes a sceptical view of constitutional judicial review. He 
presents a rich text on the apparent assumption that his readership will not 
be found among the uninitiated, but rather at desks of advanced 
constitutional scholars, and hopefully in the chambers of senior judges 
around the world. 
The customary quality that one has come to expect of the products of 
Edward Elgar Publishers is evident in the handsome presentation of this 
work. Its content is scholarly by design, in places slightly irritatingly so, for 
instance in the use of domestically fabricated acronyms such as "PEP", 
"RF", "LPL", "AEP". Although the absence of an explanatory table of labels 
of this nature for complex concepts is a shortcoming, the editing and design 
of the publication are otherwise impeccable. 
As characteristic of new democracies that emerged after the Second World 
War, Gyorfi identifies four "institutional features", the first being "dualist 
constitutional architecture". This characterisation is interesting, not only 
because of its descriptive potency, but also because the distinction between 
constitutional monism and dualism is such an important, and underutilised 
instrument in constitutional analysis. "Monism" describes what Gyorfi calls 
the orthodox model of parliamentary supremacy represented by the British 
Westminster system which lacks a supreme constitution against which 
legislation and executive and administrative actions can be tested for 
validity. This leaves it to the electorate to decide in regular popular elections 
whether the manner in which the incumbent executive steers the legislative 
process and government policy, deserves continued support. 
"Dualism" typically describes the constitutional model of the United States, 
whose supreme Constitution serves the purpose of a lasting guide for the 
determination of the supreme will of "the people", especially by the judiciary 
when weighing the constitutionality of executive, administrative and 
legislative conduct. Such determination is assumed to be done regardless 
of the periodical political reconfiguration of government. For the 
monism/dualism distinction Gyorfi rightly acknowledges Bruce Ackerman's 
analysis in his book We the People of 1991 (which is, incidentally, also 
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where Ackerman coined the phrase "constitutional moment", being a point 
in history where "the people" are persuaded to change their foundational 
stance by means of constitutional amendment or the adoption of a new 
constitution). 
Gyorfi prefers to refer to the US-type model of dualism as "the new 
constitutionalism", which has, according to him, become a widely accepted 
norm around the globe. In addition to dualism, its other institutional features 
are described to be a codified bill of rights, judicial supremacy and the robust 
exercise of judicial review. Although this book is not intended to be a 
commentary on any specific constitutional order, the dualism/monism 
dichotomy is an important factor in the analysis of post-war constitutions in 
former British colonies (where monism was the pre-constitutional norm) 
which have embraced the "new constitutionalism" with all its institutional 
features, including presidentialism (see eg Venter F, "Parliamentary 
sovereignty or presidential imperialism? The difficulties of identifying the 
source of constitutional power from the interaction between legislatures and 
executives in Anglophone Africa" in Fombad C (ed) Separation of Powers 
in African Constitutionalism (OUP Oxford 2016) Chapter 3). Gyorfi does not 
substantially address the potential of robust judicial review in jurisdictions 
where constitutionalism has only recently been adopted as a stabilising and 
developmental constitutional mechanism useful for countering 
undemocratic government conduct and political patriarchy. His slightly elitist 
focus on the well-performing democracies (especially in chapter 3) is 
nevertheless legitimate for the purposes of developing an abstract theory 
on the ideal role of the judiciary in an ideal constitutional order. 
Gyorfi's approach is rigorously structured, as is evidenced by his formulation 
of six hypotheses in the first chapter, based on a wide and well-informed 
reading of the literature on constitutionalism and constitutional 
comparativism. In the last section of the chapter one finds the research 
question posed for the study, namely whether strong judicial review is 
justified, and a hugely abstract explication of his proposed methodology, 
ending (at 39) with the following rather intimidating conclusion: 
Although the theories of constitutional interpretation, institutional design and 
political legitimacy are relatively autonomous, there is a complicated interplay 
between them, and an adequate theory must be able to handle the complexity 
of these interrelationships. 
On this basis the book proceeds in chapter 2 to develop a via media in the 
debate about the justification of judicial review, the opposing poles being 
the "principle of equal participation" and "rights foundationalism" 
respectively. According to the author the former is to be preferred, but is 
also not fully adequate. What he rather proposes is "political liberalism" 
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which, if appropriately understood and applied, significantly confines the 
range of political decisions that may legitimately be made. He prefers (at 
71) an "arbitrator conception of authority" which supports the principle of 
equal participation, but "maintains real respect for moral disagreement". 
In the next chapter, which covers more than a third of the book, Gyorfi 
makes his case against the strong form of judicial review. He argues that, 
because of the abstract nature of the typical constitutional language 
protecting rights, the adjudicator of such rights is placed in the position of "a 
moral arbitrator". This puts the authoritative interpreter of a bill of rights in 
the position to make choices between moral beliefs, without necessarily 
having to conclusively justify the eventual choice. The author challenges (at 
80-91) the idea that judicial review allows for equal participation by 
countering the arguments that courts "track public opinion" and that they 
have a "democratic pedigree", and by emphasizing the weaknesses of the 
democratic political process, contrasting the representative functions of 
elected legislatures to the position of the courts whose decisions are 
assumed to be insulated from the political process. But he points out (at 
101-102) that judges do act strategically and make compromises, causing 
them to take their "second-best options": 
Sometimes this bargaining is necessary to have a binding precedent. On other 
occasions, they make compromises in order to make a unanimous decision 
that gives additional authority to the court's decision. But they can also make 
strategic decisions by anticipating and factoring in the potential reactions of 
the other branches. 
Based on various empirical studies, Gyorfi states his view (at 151) that "in 
mature democracies there is no compelling reason to introduce the strong 
form of judicial review", to which he adds (at 168) that "the power to specify 
the meaning of abstract human rights provisions should be conferred on the 
legislature." 
Facing the reality that the pervasive implementation of "new 
constitutionalism" has created widespread "strong" judicial review, Chapter 
4 focuses on constitutional interpretation. The author raises the question (at 
170) whether "judges can avoid the moral reading of the constitution", 
despite the widely-held view that they merely interpret and apply the 
constitution, declaring what the law is. This is indeed a valuable insight 
given the illusion of judicial "neutrality" which is often, and wrongly, assumed 
to be possible, especially in cases involving cultural and religious 
controversies. Gyorfi's response is that judges cannot avoid a moral reading 
of the constitution, and then goes on to substantiate this view by exploring 
the reasons for divergent judicial findings and the strategies behind the 
phenomenon in various constitutional courts. One of these is the issue of 
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balancing and limitation of constitutional rights (discussed at 183-185). The 
chapter culminates in the author making a case, in line with the focus of the 
central argument of the book, for courts not to assume exclusive authority 
to interpret, but to show deference to the views on the interpretation of the 
constitution put forward by the other branches of government. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the postulation of "a theory of weak judicial review. 
The author interestingly distinguishes three categories of examples: limited 
judicial review due to the absence of a bill of rights, such as in Australia, 
where judges can only employ "structural-organizational norms"; 
"penultimate" judicial review, where judicial findings on the constitutionality 
of legislation can be overridden by the legislature (as in Canada); and 
deferential judicial review, where the courts are either required 
constitutionally, or traditionally do defer to the other branches, as in Sweden 
and Finland. Gyorfi identifies (at 230-236) four models of inter-institutional 
interaction, namely monological interaction between the institutions of the 
state; conflict between the will of a defiant parliament and the reason of the 
judges; shared responsibility to interpret rights, which does not compel the 
legislature to accept the judiciary's other, or alternative or inconsistent 
interpretation; and the "emergency break" model, where "the primary 
function of judges is not to develop what they believe to be the best 
interpretation of a given right, but to police the boundaries of 
reasonableness" (235). 
The short concluding chapter ends with the author's own characterisation 
(in two different paragraphs on 258) of his "pleas", namely "for both 
institutional conservatism, and institutional experimentalism", and also "for 
institutional innovation and radicalism". 
This book is indeed a thought-provoking challenge of conventional thinking 
on judicial constitutional review. The provocation is well-justified because 
the literature on the subject is so diffuse and seldom clearly focused. 
Gyorfi's research is very thorough, wide-ranging and penetrating, and he 
constantly explicates his choices and criticisms. His perspective is obviously 
European, but his analyses and theorization are of global import. Although 
the approach is one of high-level scholarship, requiring the reader to set 
aside some time to absorb and understand the sometimes abstract 
structuring and classification of the author's postulations, it would be a pity 
if the primary readership would not be judges around the world, especially 
those who bear the responsibility of constitutional jurisdiction. Even if 
readers may not be fully convinced by Gyorfi's "pleas", the text can be 
expected to induce some serious judicial (and scholarly) introspection. The 
challenges that Gyorfi poses to the conventions of constitutional 
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adjudication must certainly confront any reader who lives under the illusion 
that constitutional justice can be based on neutral technicalities, at least with 
the urgent need to reconsider their understanding of the nature of 
constitutional adjudication which has become such an important global 
phenomenon in 21st Century constitutionalism. 
Francois Venter 
